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ARTICLE
THE "FINDER'S" EXCEPTION FROM FEDERAL
BROKER-DEALER REGISTRATION
John Polanin, Jr.*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Brokers and dealers in securities have been required to register with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission) since 1935.1 The original section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act or Act)
authorized the Commission to adopt rules requiring registration by brokerdealers that were not already members of the securities exchanges.' In 1936,
Congress amended section 15 to codify, for the most part, the rules adopted
by the Commission one year earlier.'
The federal broker-dealer registration requirements are consistent with
the lofty purposes of the Exchange Act, which include "protecting the public
... with respect to trading in securities, through.., the regulation of brokers and dealers and the securities markets.",4 The statutory definitions
designating the persons5 subject to these requirements are broad in scope. A
"broker" under the Act is "any person engaged in the business of effecting
• Vice President and Assistant General Counsel, The First Boston Corporation. Formerly Branch Chief, Office of Chief Counsel, Division of Market Regulation, Securities and

Exchange Commission. The Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for
any private publication or statement by any of its employees. The views expressed in this

paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of
the author's colleagues on the staff of the Commission.
1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 15, 48 Stat. 881, 895-96

(1934) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (1988)).
2. Id.
3. Act of May 27, 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-621, § 3, 49 Stat. 1375, 1377 (amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934); see also S. Rep. No. 1739, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1936); H.R.
Rep. No. 2601, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1936).
4.

EZRA WEISS, REGISTRATION AND REGULATION OF BROKERS AND DEALERS, xii

(1965).
5. A "person" for purposes of the Act is "a natural person, company, government, or
political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a government." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9)
(1988).
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transactions in securities for the account of others,"'6 but the statutory definition does not include banks. 7 A "dealer," on the other hand, is a "person
engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his own account,
through a broker or otherwise."' Finally, section 15 of the Exchange Act
makes it unlawful for any broker or dealer to use "the mails or any means or
instrumentality" of interstate commerce 9 "to effect any transactions in, or to
induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of," any security,'0 other
than exempted securities, 1 commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, and
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1988).
7. A "bank" for purposes of the Act is:
(A) a banking institution organized under the laws of the United States, (B) a member bank of the Federal Reserve System, (C) any other banking institution, whether
incorporated or not, doing business under the laws of any State or of the United

States, a substantial portion of the business of which consists of receiving deposits or
exercising fiduciary powers similar to those permitted to national banks under section 1 (k) of the Federal Reserve Act, as amended, and which is supervised and
examined by State or Federal authority having supervision over banks, and which is
not operated for the purpose of evading the provisions of [the Exchange Act], and
(D) a receiver, conservator, or other liquidating agent of any institution or firm included in clauses (A), (B), or (C) of this paragraph.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(6) (1988). Associated persons of an issuer of securities who sell only that
issuer's securities are, in certain circumstances, exempt from the definition of broker. 17
C.F.R. § 240.3a4-1 (1991).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (1988). The definition "does not include a bank, or any person
insofar as he buys or sells securities for his own account, either individually or in some fiduciary capacity, but not as part of a regular business." Id. Although the explicit language of this
definition is broad, the Commission has noted that "it has been interpreted to exclude various
activities not within the intent of the definition, such as buying and selling for investment."
Registration Requirements for Foreign Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 27,017
(July 11, 1989), 54 Fed. Reg. 30,013, 30,015 n.17 (1989) (citing United Savings Association of
Texas, SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2021 (Apr. 2, 1987); William 0.
Douglas & George E. Bates, Some Effects of the SecuritiesAct Upon Investment Banking, 1 U.
Cm. L. REV. 283, 302 n.68 (1934); William 0. Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal
Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 206 n.189 (1933)).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1). "Interstate commerce," for purposes of the Act, is defined as:
trade, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States, or between any foreign country and any State, or between any State and any place or ship
outside thereof, [including] intrastate use of (A) any facility of a national securities
exchange or of a telephone or other interstate means of communication, or (B) any
other interstate instrumentality.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17) (1988). The Act specifically excludes "a broker or dealer whose business is exclusively intrastate and who does not make use of any facility of a national securities
exchange." 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1).
10. "Security" is defined in section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)
(1988).
11. The terms "exempted security" and "exempted securities" are defined in section
3(a)(12) of the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (1988).
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commercial bills,' 2 unless the broker or dealer is registered with the
Commission. 3
Registration serves important purposes and has a central place in the federal regulatory system governing broker-dealers. Finders, however, have
perennially maintained that they are not subject to the broker-dealer registration requirements. Finders argue that they are not engaged in the business of 'effecting securities transactions, because they merely "find" and place
in contact with each other, for a fee, potential buyers and sellers of securities
who will then complete any resulting transactions.14 A coherent interpretation of the broker-dealer registration requirements, as applied to finders, necessitates a precise definition of the meaning of "effecting" transactions. If
precision is impossible or ultimately undesirable, a principled justification
for interpreting the term broadly or narrowly should be established.
Accordingly, this article analyzes the Commission's administrative decisions, the "no-action" letters issued by the Commission's staff,15 and the
handful of relevant cases discussing the application of the federal brokerdealer registration requirements to finders. Three general classes of finders
are identified: (i) finders for registered broker-dealers, including licensed professionals, other non-brokerage businesses, depository institutions, and com12. Commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, and commercial bills are not defined in the
Exchange Act. Nonetheless, the Commission has recognized that "the definition of 'security'
in section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act .. .generally is understood to exclude instruments
exempt from registration under section 3(a)(3) of the Securities Act [of 1933] ...by virtue of
their classification as commercial paper." Exchange Act Release No. 27,017, 54 Fed. Reg.
30,015 n.21 (citing Registration Exemption for Short-Term Paper, Securities Act Release No.
4412, [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,786 (Sept. 20, 1961)); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1).
14. See Gregory S. Crespi, The Reach of the FederalRegistration Requirements for Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers, 17 SEC. REG. L.J. 339, 344-48 (1990); Denis T. Rice, The
Expanding Requirement for Registration as "Broker-Dealer" Under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 201 (1974).
15. A "no-action" letter is a response from the staff of the Commission to an inquiry
requesting assurances in connection with a proposed transaction implicating the federal securities laws. Based on the facts and representations set forth in the inquiry, the staff states that it
will not recommend enforcement action to the Commission if the parties making the request
proceed as they describe, without complying with specific statutory or regulatory provisions of
those laws. A no-action letter represents the staff's position concerning enforcement action
only, and it is not a legal opinion. See Thomas P. Lemke, The No-Action Letter Process, 42
Bus. LAW. 1019 (1987). In addition, the staff's no-action positions may not be deemed agency
action, at least for purposes of judicial review. See Board of Trade v. SEC, 883 F.2d 525, 52931 (7th Cir. 1989); Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1974). But see Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403
(1972) (finding that Commission's review of staff's action concerning shareholder proposal
was an administrative action subject to review).
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mon-interest groups;' 6 (ii) finders for issuers, including persons who
promote the sale of a new issue of securities, financial advisers who provide
consulting services regarding the issuance of securities, persons who facilitate merger and acquisition activities, so-called "business brokers," and persons who match investors with entrepreneurs seeking financing;' 7 and (iii)
finders for investors, including listing services and trading systems. I" The
purpose of this analysis is to determine whether each class of finders should
be treated as not "engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities," and thus properly deemed outside the scope of the definition of broker
in section 3(a)(4) of the Exchange Act.19
In particular, this article will consider whether the activities of the members of each class are sufficiently limited to justify being outside the reach of
the Act. This article will also address whether the nature of finders' compensation offers them incentives to exceed those limits. It will also consider
whether the meaning of "effecting" transactions can be clarified, and
whether the rationale for requiring broker-dealer registration can be elucidated. The article concludes that public policy, while supporting a broad
construction of the phrase "effecting transactions in securities," also supports a limited exception from the broker-dealer registration requirements
for legitimate finders, depending on the nature of their activities and their
compensation.
II.

OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL BROKER-DEALER REGULATION

A.

Purposes and Scope

The rationale for broker-dealer registration is directly related to both the
public interest and the protection of investors, even though Congress has not
clearly elucidated this relationship.2 ° Congress repeatedly has confirmed the
importance of registration, however, by requiring registration of exchange
16. See infra notes 62-161 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 162-209 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 210-30 and accompanying text.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4). The interpretation of the definition of dealer in section 3(a)(5)
of the Act is beyond the scope of this article. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5).
20. Congress has never fully articulated its goals in requiring broker-dealer registration
because of the tentative manner in which the current scheme for broker-dealer registration
evolved. Congress did view the registration requirement, however, as an element of the overall
mechanics of regulating trading in over-the-counter securities. Regulation of the over-thecounter market was necessary to discourage listed issuers and traders of listed securities from
the temptation of avoiding the discipline of the exchanges. DAVID A. LIPTON, BROKERDEALER REGULATION, § 1.03, at 1-10 (15 Securities Law Series 1988).
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members, specialists, floor brokers, and traders on the exchanges, 2 1 municipal securities dealers,2 2 and government securities brokers and dealers.2 3
The Commission views broker-dealer registration as essential to protecting
prospective purchasers of securities.24
Indeed, the Commission has stated that the "requirement that non-exempt broker-dealers register as such is a keystone of the entire system of
broker-dealer regulation., 25 Each registered broker-dealer must join either
a registered national securities association 26 or a registered national securities exchange, 27 depending on whether the broker-dealer trades securities
over-the-counter or listed on that exchange.28 It is through membership in
these self-regulatory organizations (SROs) 29 that broker-dealers become subject to standards of professional competence, 3° disciplinary standards restricting entry into the securities business, 3 1 rules governing their sales
practices, 32 requirements for fidelity bonds,333 and fingerprinting of securities
industry personnel.34
21. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 11, 89 Stat. 97, 121-27
(1975).
22. Id. § 13, 89 Stat. at 131-37.
23. Government Securities Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-571, § 101, 100 Stat. 3208 (1986).
24. "[N]o amount of disclosure in a prospectus can be effective to protect investors unless
the securities are sold by a salesman who understands and appreciates both the nature of the
securities he sells and his responsibilities to the investor to whom he sells." Persons Deemed
Not To Be Brokers, Exchange Act Release No. 20,943 (May 9, 1984), 49 Fed. Reg. 20,512,
20,515 (1984) (quoting Report of Special Study of SecuritiesMarkets, H.R. Doc. No. 94, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 588 (1963)).
25. Frank W. Leonesio, Exchange Act Release No. 23,524, 36 SEC Docket 457, 464
(Aug. 11, 1986); Eugene T. Ichinose, Jr., Exchange Act Release No. 17,381, 21 SEC Docket
970, 975 (Dec. 16, 1980).
26. Exchange Act, § 15A, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1988). Only the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) has qualified to date.
27. Id. § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1988).
28. Id. § 15(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (1988).
29. Id. § 3(a)(26), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26) (1988).
30. Id. § 15(b)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(7) (1988); see also NASD Schedules to By-Laws,
Schedule C, reprinted in NASD Manual (CCH)
1782-1792 (July 1990); New York Stock
Exchange, Inc. (NYSE) Rules 10, 345, reprintedin N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH)
2010, 2345 (Oct.
1989).
31. Exchange Act, § 3(a)(39), 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(39) (1988) (barring membership in, or
association with, a member of an SRO, based on adverse disciplinary history).
32. E.g., NASD Rules of Fair Practice, reprinted in NASD Manual (CCH)
2001-2401
(Jan. 1990).
33. E.g., NYSE Rule 319, reprinted in N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2319 (Oct. 1988); NASD
Rules of Fair Practice, Art. III, § 32, reprinted in NASD Manual (CCH) 2182 (May 1988).
34. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17f-2(a) (1991). Rule 17f-2(a) applies, with certain exceptions, not
only to partners, directors, officers, and employees of members of national securities exchanges, but also to partners, directors, officers, and employees of every broker, dealer, registered transfer agent, and registered clearing agency. Id.
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Registration also subjects broker-dealers to the regulatory authority of the
Commission. The Commission can discipline registered broker-dealers, and
persons associated with them, for violations of statutory and regulatory provisions of the federal securities laws and related requirements.3 5 Registered

broker-dealers must comply with the Commission's financial responsibility
rules, which prescribe minimum levels of capital adequacy36 and establish

requirements for the maintenance of reserves and the custody of customers'
securities. 37 Registered broker-dealers also must join the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation,3" which insures brokerage customers for the total
value of cash and securities in their accounts up to $500,000, with a limit of
$100,000 on cash. 9 The Commission's rules governing registered brokerdealers also regulate their operations," proscribe their use of "any manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance" to effect, induce,

or attempt to induce any transaction in securities,4" and mandate compliance with other important requirements.4 2
The adverse consequences of failing to register can be severe. The Commission is authorized to seek civil injunctions in federal district court against
persons violating or about to violate the provisions of the Exchange Act,
including the broker-dealer registration requirements. 43 The Commission
35. 15 U.S.C.
36. 17 C.F.R.
37. 17 C.F.R.
38. Securities

§§ 78o(b)(4), (6) (1988).
§ 240.15c3-1 (1991).
§ 240.15c3-3 (1991).
Investor Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA), § 3(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(a)(2)

(1988).
39. SIPA, § 9(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ffT(a) (1988).
40. See, e.g., Rules 17a-3 (recordkeeping), 17a-4 (record preservation), 17a-5 (reporting),
17a-13 (quarterly security counts), 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17a-3, 17a-4, 17a-5, 17a-13 (1991).
41. Exchange Act, § 15(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (1988). Under section 15(c) of the
Exchange Act, the Commission is authorized to adopt rules defining and prohibiting use of
these devices and contrivances. Id.; see, e.g., Rules 15cl-3 (misrepresentation as to registration), 15cl-5 (disclosure of control), 15cl-6 (disclosure of interest in distribution), 15c2-4
(transmission or maintenance of payments received in connection with underwritings), 15c2-6
(sales practice requirements for certain low-priced securities), 15c2-8 (delivery of prospectus),
15c2-11 (initiation or resumption of quotations without specified information), and 15c2-12
(municipal securities disclosure), 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15cl-3, 15cl-5, 15cl-6, 15c2-4, 15c2-6,
15c2-8, 15c2-11, 15c2-12 (1991).
On occasion courts have found that, regulations aside, a broker-dealer owes a fiduciary duty
to its customers because it holds itself out to the public as a securities professional. See, e.g.,
Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969) ("A securities dealer occupies a special relationship to a buyer of securities in that by his position he implicitly represents he has an
adequate basis for the opinions he renders.")
42. See, e.g., Rules 14b-1 (prompt forwarding of proxy information to beneficial owners of
securities), 17a-8 (financial recordkeeping and reporting of currency and foreign transactions),
and 17f-1 (reports and inquiries about missing, lost, counterfeit, or stolen securities), 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.14b-1, 17a-8, 17f-1 (1991).
43. Exchange Act, § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1988).
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may seek civil money penalties as well.'

The Commission also has the au-

thority, after notice and opportunity for hearing, to issue a cease-and-desist
order in response to a violation of these provisions." In addition, the Com-

mission is authorized to refer the matter to the Attorney General for prosecution.4 6 Finally, failure to register when required is grounds for denial by
the Commission of a later application for broker-dealer registration.4 7
Some remedies for customers of unregistered broker-dealers also exist.

Generally, courts have not implied a private right of action under Section
15(a). 4 8 The reach of section 29(b) of the Exchange Act, which, with certain
exceptions, renders void "[e]very contract made in violation of any provision
of [the Act]," 4 9 has been interpreted, however, to allow rescission of transactions in securities with unregistered broker-dealers. 5" Damages may be
awarded in lieu of rescission, 5 although "in most instances the requisite
causal relationship between the plaintiff's injuries and the failure to register
would be difficult to establish."5 2 Nonetheless, unregistered broker-dealers
44. Id. § 21A, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (1988)
45. Id. § 21C, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (1990).
46. Id. § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1988) (conviction for willful failure to register can
result in a fine of up to $1,000,000 ($2,500,000 for persons other than natural persons) and
imprisonment for up to ten years); see, e.g., Guon v. U.S., 285 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1960) (imposing sentence of two years' probation for criminal violation of broker-dealer registration
requirements).
47. Exchange Act, § 15(b)(4)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(C).
48. See, e.g., Brannan v. Eisenstein, 804 F.2d 1041, 1043 (8th Cir. 1986); Admiralty Fund
v. Hugh Johnson & Co., 677 F.2d 1301, 1313 (9th Cir. 1982); Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 789-91 (8th Cir. 1967); Goodman v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 698 F.
Supp. 1078 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Baum v. Phillips, Appel & Walden, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1518
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); Bull v. American Bank & Trust Co. of Pa., 641 F. Supp. 62, 65 (E.D. Pa.
1986); Walck v. American Stock Exch., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 1051, 1058-59 (E.D. Pa. 1981),
aff'd, 687 F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 942 (1983). Contra Opper v. Hancock Securities Corp., 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966).
49. Exchange Act, § 29(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1988).
50. See, e.g., Regional Properties, Inc. v. Financial & Real Estate Consulting Co., 678
F.2d 552, 558 (5th Cir. 1982); Eastside Church of Christ v. National Plan, Inc., 391 F.2d 357
(5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Church of Christ v. National Plan, Inc., 393 U.S. 913 (1968).
See generally Samuel H. Gruenbaum & Marc I. Steinberg, Section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Viable Remedy Awakened, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1979).
51. Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc., 329 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1964).
52. SHELDON M. JAFFE, BROKER-DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS: A GUIDE TO
THE REGULATORY PROCESS § 2.05, at 24 (1977) (citing Hayden v. Walston & Co., Inc., 528
F.2d 901, 902 (9th Cir. 1975)).
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remain subject to both the antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws53 and to the Commission's broker-dealer regulations.54
B.

The "Finder"Phenomenon

The definition of "broker" in section 3(a)(4)" would seem to encompass
finders, because they initiate securities transactions between buyers and sellers and because traditionally the Commission has broadly interpreted the
phrase "effecting transactions." 56 The widespread occurrence of the finder
phenomenon, however, testifies to both the perceived validity and the
demonstrated utility of this de facto exception from broker-dealer
registration:
In numerical terms, perhaps more persons rely upon [the finder's]
exception than on any other provision in the 1934 Act. It is the
small businessman's exclusion and the basis upon which innumerable local "consultants" perform financial services for friends and
associates without complying with the formal registration, record
keeping [sic], and other requirements imposed upon brokers by
§ 15 of the 1934 Act. The strict definition of a "finder" is relatively narrow and would probably exclude, if tested, the majority
who claim it as protection....
Accordingly, in practice if not in theory, a distinction appears to
have developed between the professional masking as an amateur
and the amateur inadvertently trespassing into the area of the professional. The registration requirements are only intermittantly
[sic] enforced against the amateur but are strictly enforced against
the professionals or those who engage in the securities business on
a regular basis.57
53. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 17(a), 48 Stat. 74, 84-85 (1933) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1988)); Exchange Act, §§ 10(b), 15(c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b),
78o(c) (1988); Rules lOb-5, 15cl-2, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, 15cl-2 (1991).
54. Exchange Act, § 3(a)(48), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(48) (1988) (stating that definition of
"registered broker or dealer" includes all broker-dealers required to register even if they have
not done so). Some of the statutory and regulatory provisions described above as applicable to
registered broker-dealers are actually applicable by their own terms to unregistered brokerdealers as well. See, e.g., Exchange Act, §§ 15(b)(4), (6), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(4), (6); Rules
15c3-1, 15c3-3, 17a-3, 17a-4, 17a-5, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15c3-1, 15c3-3, 17a-3, 17a-4, 17a-5
(1991).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1988).
56. "To 'effect' a transaction includes 'any participation in a transaction whether as principal, agent, or both.'" WEISS, supra note 4, at 106 n. 12 (quoting Exchange Act Release No.
605 (Apr. 17, 1936) (defining "effecting transactions" in connection with Section 11(d)(2) of
the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78k(d)(2))).
57. JAFFE, supra note 52, § 2.04, at 21-22.
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Even though finders fit within the literal language of section 15(a)(l), 5" the
staff's practice of not requiring certain finders to register as broker-dealers
releases them from all the attendant regulatory requirements.5 9
This result may not always comport with sound public policy. In fact,
Congress, albeit in the underwriting context, has noted that there are a
number of problems inherent in not requiring finders to register.' Defining
what it means to "effect" transactions, however, has proven to be difficult.
For example, the leading commentator on federal securities regulation stated
that "[a]lthough a finder may 'induce the purchase or sale of' a security
within the meaning of § 15(a), he is not normally a 'broker' because he effects no transactions." 6 1 This statement, nevertheless, begs the ultimate
question of what it means to effect a transaction in securities, a theoretical
question whose practical implications become clearer in the light of actual
cases.
III.

FINDING INVESTORS FOR BROKER-DEALERS

It is only natural that an important manifestation of the finder phenomenon would be the activities of persons who find investors for registered broker-dealers. As commissioned salesmen, broker-dealers understandably
have a continual need for new customers. Persons willing to locate prospective customers for a broker-dealer are of great value, especially if the brokerdealer does not have to incur the expense of employing those persons, registering them as associated persons with the broker-dealer's SRO, and supervising their activities. Yet, this type of arrangement is not without its
perils.6 2
58. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (1988).
59. One commentator has identified four factors, or "badges," of broker-dealer activity
that the staff considers when applying the broker-dealer registration requirements to finders.
These factors include: (i) involvement in negotiations; (ii) discussing details concerning securities, or making recommendations; (iii) transaction-based compensation; and (iv) previous involvement in the sale of securities. DAVID A. LIPTON, supra note 20, § 1.04[3][6][ii][A].
60. S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115-16 (1934). The Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency reported that "the institution of 'finder's' fees [for recommending investment banking transactions] is undesirable for the reason that it encourages activities looking to the flotation of securities regardless of their soundness. It also involves additional
expense, which is ultimately passed on to the investing public." Id.
61. Louis Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1299 (2d ed. 1961). Recently, however, Loss
has qualified the definition of a finder in an apparent recognition of the potentially detrimental
effect of the finder phenomenon on the scope of the broker-dealer registration requirements.
Loss noted that "although a pure finder may 'induce the purchase or sale of' a security within
the meaning of § 15(a), he is not normally a broker because he effects no transactions. He
merely brings buyer and seller together." Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 609 (1988) (emphasis added).
62. See WEISS, supra note 4, at 7. Weiss recognized the following difficulties:
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Licensed Professionals

Despite these potential problems, the staff has taken no-action positions
regarding the activities of accountants6 3 and insurance agents'M who referred
their clients to registered broker-dealers.6 5 Generally, the accountants or
insurance agents provided information to their clients concerning only the
services offered by the broker-dealers and not the merits of any particular
security.6 6 Sometimes, additional activities were performed, such as providing administrative services to the broker-dealer,6 7 collecting from the clients
financial information prescribed by the broker-dealer,6 8 and arranging meetings between the clients and the broker-dealer.69
These arrangements were to continue indefinitely and were not one-time
occurrences. As a result, they would constitute part of the "business" of the
accountants and insurance agents. Relying principally on the limited nature
Problems would... arise in connection with certain practices of some broker-dealers
... if these broker-dealers should circulate invitations to attorneys and accountants,
upon the inducement of a commission, to sell to their clients the securities being
offered by such broker-dealers. Apart from questions as to violation of anti-fraud
provisions of the federal securities laws, acceptance of these proposals would result in
the accountants and attorneys becoming engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others, and thereby becoming brokers.
Id. (footnote omitted). See generally NICHOLAS WOLFSON ET AL., REGULATION OF BROKERS, DEALERS, AND SECURITIES MARKETS, § 1.09 (1977).

63. See Biscotti & Co. Certified Public Accountants, P.C., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2924 (Oct. 28, 1985); Redmond Assocs., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1589 (Dec. 11, 1984).
64. Colonial Equities Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 862 (June
28, 1988) (also addressing real estate agency); M Financial, SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 786 (June 14, 1988).
65. The staff recently took a similar no-action position regarding an investment adviser.
The adviser proposed to refer its clients to a registered broker-dealer for execution of their
securities transactions at the broker-dealer's usual commission rates or mark-ups. The brokerdealer would remit a portion of these commissions or mark-ups to a trust fund established for
the exclusive benefit of the clients. If the clients' employers had retained the adviser to provide
services to the clients and had treated the value of these services as additional income to the
clients for purposes of federal income tax, the employers would offset the clients' monies in the
trust fund against this additional income, thereby reducing the clients' federal income tax liability. See Asset Management Group, SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1016
(Sept. 20, 1989).
66. In one case, however, the accountants proposed to act as purchaser representatives in
an offering of securities exempt from Securities Act registration under Regulation D, 17
C.F.R. §§ 230.501-508 (1991), and to become registered representatives of a broker-dealer for
the purpose of placing orders for mutual fund shares. See Biscotti & Co., SEC No-Action
Letter, supra note 63.
67. See M Financial, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 64.
68. See Colonial Equities, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 64.
69. Id.
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of the activities permitted under the arrangements,7" and to a somewhat
lesser extent on the nature of the compensation received by the finders, however, the staff did not deem participation in these arrangements to constitute
the business of effecting securities transactions. In one case, accountants
represented that the ethical rules of the American Institute of Certified Pub-

lic Accountants at the time forbade receipt of contingency fees or commissions. 7 ' Consequently, the accountants would rebate to their clients any
commissions received. Under one particularly elaborate compensation
scheme, the finders received a one-time, flat fee of $500 for properly identifying a potential customer sought by the broker-dealer, and an additional one-

time, flat fee of $1000 for arranging a meeting between the broker-dealer and
the potential customer. 72 While creative, these fees do not resemble or function as a surrogate for brokerage commissions.

In another case, counsel disclosed that the finders would receive one-time
fees based on the size of retirement accounts opened with the brokerdealer. 73 The staff also has permitted compensation to be based, in part, on

aggregate insurance premium revenues, including commissions on transac70. In one case, employees of insurance agencies and a realty company would ask their
clients to complete questionnaires that had been prepared by the broker-dealer. They would
inform the clients that the broker-dealer would use the biographical and financial information
from the questionnaires to decide whether to contact them regarding the possible purchase of
certain limited partnership interests. In addition, the employees would review the questionnaires for completeness and send completed questionnaires to the broker-dealer. The brokerdealer might also ask the insurance agency employees to provide introductions to their clients,
either in person or over the telephone. None of the employees, however, could make any
statements to their clients about the nature or advisability of investing in the limited partnership, nor could they handle any funds or securities. Counsel represented that the broker-dealer
would closely monitor the employees' activities, and that violation of restrictions placed on the
employees' permissible activities would cause the broker-dealer to terminate its arrangements
with these finders. Id.
71. Biscotti & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 63.
72. Colonial Equities, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 64. Although these fees were
high, counsel's justification for them was based on the broker-dealer's predictions regarding
the large financial investment that it was seeking, and expecting, from potential customers.
These fees could be adjusted by the broker-dealer, as to all finders participating in the arrangement, once in each twelve-month period, and only prospectively. The fees would not vary with
brokerage commissions earned on investments made by potential customers. Indeed, counsel's
initial proposal, which the final response indicates was rejected by the staff, called for the
finders to receive a percentage of these net brokerage commissions. Id.
Although potentially expansive in its application, the approach permitted by the staff in this
case actually may be of limited utility. A supplemental response from the staff indicated that
the finders' activities raised might constitute "general solicitation" impermissible under Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-508 (1991). Colonial Equities Corp., SEC No-Action Letter,
1988 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1291 (Sept. 2, 1988).
73. Redmond Associates, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 63 (representing that the
fees would bear no relation to commissions earned on securities transactions in the accounts or
to subsequent investments).
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tions in insurance securities.74 In reality, these other types of payments are
compensation based on the outcome of securities transactions. They provide
a powerful incentive for finders to conduct sales efforts exceeding the scope
of their purportedly limited activities, and thus implicate the policies supporting broker-dealer registration. In other words, persons regularly compensated for their securities activities as if they were broker-dealers-by
receiving a commission-are likely to engage in the same business practices
as broker-dealers and should be regulated as such. 75 The staff's no-action
positions in these cases appear to depart from what would be a sound general
rule, in terms of both administrative practice and public policy: requiring
registration of persons who receive transaction-based compensation for their
securities-related activities.7 6
B. Other Non-BrokerageBusinesses
The staff also has taken no-action positions on broker-dealer registration
regarding the activities of other types of businesses that proposed to refer
their customers to broker-dealers, 77 although on at least two occasions a noaction request of this type was denied.7 8 The requests which met with the
staff's approval involved businesses that would provide their customers with
general information about broker-dealers and the services that they offer.
74. M Financial, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 64.
75. While receipt of transaction-based compensation should be a sufficient condition to
define the recipient as a broker, it should not be necessary in all cases. A person's activities as
an intermediary in connection with securities transactions could place that person within the
definition of broker, regardless of the nature of the person's compensation. See infra notes
162-209 and accompanying text.
76. For example, in other areas, the Commission has favored a policy of functional regulation, such that an entity is regulated not according to its form, but according to its activities.
E.g., Role of FinancialInstitutions: Hearingson H.R. 2557 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 48, 54 (1987) (statement of David S. Ruder, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission) ("[L]egislation is needed in order to apply functional regulation to the financial services industry. If banks are to engage in securities activities, they should be subject to the same
regulations as are all other entities engaged in those activities.").
77. Original Fin. Info. Ctrs. of Am., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 2503 (Aug. 31, 1987) (proposing to open "Financial Information Centers" in shopping
malls to provide advertising formats for different types of financial products and services);
Financial Charters and Acquisitions, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
2821 (Nov. 25, 1984) (proposing to provide consulting services to savings and loan
associations).
78. John M. McGivney Securities, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 2159 (May 20, 1985) (proposing that broker-dealer would make payments to a nonsecurities firm based on a percentage of commissions or transaction-based compensation);
George T. Baylor, SEC No-Action Letter, 1971 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 3245 (Sept. 5, 1971)
(proposing to establish a restaurant containing telephone lines to brokerage houses).
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For example, one business proposed to make available free information
about providers of financial services, including mutual funds and brokerdealers.7 9 Compensation to the business from these advertisers was limited
to fees based on their rental of space at each location and on their use of
electronic message boards.8 ° There also would be direct telephone lines to
broker-dealers, an electronic ticker-tape reporting current stock prices, the
Dow Jones news service, and a stock-quotation machine.8 1 Each location
would be staffed only by employees of the business, who would not receive
transaction-based compensation, dispense financial advice, or aid consumers
in selecting financial services. Compensation received by both the business
and its employees was strictly limited, and neither the business nor its employees would consummate securities transactions or hold customers'
funds.82
The staff's negative responses confirm the importance of the remuneration
paid to providers of information about broker-dealers and the latter's services. In 1971, a restaurant proposed to display transactions taking place on
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the American Stock Exchange
83
(Amex), in addition to offering telephone lines to various broker-dealers.
Without promoting a particular firm or security, the restaurant would receive a fee from those broker-dealers.8 4 The staff informed the restaurant
that those activities would require broker-dealer registration. 5 This scenario closely resembles one to which the staff did not object in 1987,86 a response which appears to represent a softening of the staff's position
regarding these arrangements.8 7 Moreover, the 1971 request did not expressly exclude a share of commissions or other transaction-based payments
from the remuneration to be received by the restaurant, as did the 1987 request. The staff's responses are consistent, therefore, with another denial of
a no-action position in this area, in which a broker-dealer proposed to pay a
"finder's fee" based on a percentage of brokerage commissions to a non79. Original Fin. Info. Ctrs., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 77.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. In its response, the staff included a warning about the applicability of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws to the proposal. See supra note 53.
83. George T. Baylor, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 78.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Original Fin. Info. Ctrs., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 77.
87. The information provided in the 1971 scenario apparently comprised reports of actual
securities transactions, rather than merely quotations, as in the 1987 situation. See George T.
Baylor, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 78; Original Fin. Info. Ctrs., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 77. In the presence of direct telephone lines to broker-dealers, however, both
types of information can be viewed as incentives to trade.
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securities firm performing unspecified activities. 8 The staff flatly stated that
registration would be required of any person receiving a percentage of commissions or other transaction-based compensation. 9
C. Depository Institution Networking
A "networking" arrangement is a specialized type of program in which
non-brokerage businesses refer their customers to broker-dealers. The arrangement is generally between a depository institution, such as a bank or
savings and loan association, and a registered broker-dealer. The brokerdealer usually maintains a physical presence on the premises of the depository institution, and the latter's customers are encouraged to use the services
of that broker-dealer in connection with their securities transactions. In return, the depository institution receives a portion of the commissions earned
by the broker-dealer on those transactions.
The first networking arrangement was approved by the Commission itself
in 1982.90 It has served as a model for the plethora of letters that the staff
has issued in this area. The Commission considered a registered brokerdealer's proposal to offer brokerage services on the premises of savings and
loan associations. The broker-dealer would function as an "introducing broker," with funds and securities flowing directly between its clearing broker
and the customers. 9 ' The broker-dealer would not engage in any underwriting or dealing activities, and it would not recommend to customers the se88. McGivney Securities, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 78.
89. Id. But see Financial Charters and Acquisitions, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note
77. In that case, a business proposed to introduce a broker-dealer to financial institutions
potentially interested in the broker-dealer's hedging strategies, without describing those strategies or participating in negotiations between the broker-dealer and the financial institutions.
The business could receive alternative fees, one of which was equal to one-third of the gross
commissions realized by the broker-dealer from accounts opened by the financial institutions.
The fee was payable, however, only from commissions on trades in exempt securities, as defined in section 3(a)(12) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (1988), or in instruments
excluded by section 15(a)(1). Id. The latter instruments include commercial paper, bankers'
acceptances, and commercial bills. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(l) (1988).
90. Savings Ass'n Inv. Sec., SEC No-Action Letter, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 77,228 (July 8, 1982).
91. An introducing broker may be defined as follows:
A broker-dealer that, under a contractual arrangement with a carrying or clearing
broker-dealer, transmits funds, securities and orders of customers to the clearing firm
which executes the orders and maintains custody of the customer funds and securities. The clearing firms' contractual responsibilities also include the proper disposition of customer funds and securities after trade date, the transfer to the customer of
funds and securities after settlement and the maintenance of certain records.
Division of Market Regulation, Securities and Exchange Commission, The October 1987 Market Break 1-3 (Feb. 1988). For a technical discussion of the relationship between introducing
and clearing or carrying brokers, see William J. Fitzpatrick & Ronald T. Carman, An Analysis
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curities of any issuers that had lending relationships with the savings and
loan associations. The broker-dealer would conduct its securities business in
areas segregated from those where the business of the savings and loan association occurred. The broker-dealer would prepare and approve all advertising, promotional material, customer application forms, and confirmations.
Monthly statements would make clear that securities services were being
provided by the broker-dealer and not the savings and loan associations. Finally, the broker-dealer would develop a compliance manual for the use of
the savings and loan associations in fulfilling their responsibilities under the
arrangement. 92
Personnel of the savings and loan associations would become registered
representatives of the broker-dealer and dual employees of the broker-dealer
and the savings and loan associations, receiving a salary instead of commissions. 93 The activities of unregistered employees were limited to distributing
literature to customers and other persons. The savings and loan associations
would be deemed associated persons of the broker-dealer under section
3(a)(18) of the Exchange Act,9 4 and they would receive one-half of the broker-dealer's commissions from securities transactions initiated on their
premises. 9 5
The Commission was aware of the ground-breaking nature of its approval
of this arrangement, which expressly was conditioned on "strict adherence"
to the representations made in counsel's letter.9 6 The no-action letter emphasized the role played by the registered broker-dealer and noted that all
personnel of the savings and loan association engaged in securities activities
would be subject to the Commission's regulations and the SROs' rules. The
letter did not agree with counsel's opinion that participating savings and
loan associations would not be brokers within the meaning of section
of the Business and Legal Relationship Between Introducing and Carrying Brokers, 40 Bus.

LAW. 47 (1984).
92. Savings Ass'n Inv. Sec., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 90.
93. Id. Personnel of the savings and loan associations would be trained, supervised, and
controlled by the broker-dealer, and they could be fired or suspended from their employment
with the savings and loan associations if they were barred or suspended from association with
the broker-dealer.

94. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(18) (1988).
95. Savings Ass'n Inv. Sec., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 90. Further conditions
were imposed on the savings and loans associations. The broker-dealer's records on the premises of the savings and loan associations were required to be available for inspection by the
Commission. In advertising, the savings and loan associations could be mentioned only as the
locations at which the broker-dealer was offering its services, and these references could not be
prominent. In addition, the savings and loan associations could not handle customers' funds
or securities. Id.
96. By their very nature, all no-action positions are limited to their facts. See supra note
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3(a)(4).9 7 The Commission warned that there were "substantial arguments
to the contrary" based on the "structural and financial relationship" be98
tween the parties.
This caution was appropriate. Even though counsel argued that the savings and loan associations would not be engaged in the business of effecting
securities transactions by referring their customers and others on their premises to the broker-dealer in return for a share of the commissions on resulting
securities transactions, it was clear that they would be acting as finders for
the registered broker-dealer. On the other hand, registration would result in
little more protection than that afforded by the presence of the registered
broker-dealer and would have been impractical in any case, due to the inability of the savings and loan associations to comply with the Commission's net
capital rule99 because of their mortgage loan portfolios. The impetus for the
no-action letter appears to have been the increasing involvement of banks in
the securities business, and the concomitant need for savings and loan associations (which fall outside the scope of section 3(a)(6)"° and are potentially within the definition of broker) to compete with banks in that business.
Thus, unlike other finders, the participating savings and loan associations
were allowed to receive commissions without becoming registered brokerdealers. 1o
The current staff position on depository institution networking arrangements has changed somewhat, as an examination of a representative recent
letter shows. 102 Credit unions are now permitted to network with brokerdealers. Brokerage services may be provided off the premises of the depository institution and the use of joint employees appears to have become infrequent. The staff now requires an affirmative representation that the brokerdealer will control, properly supervise, and be responsible for the brokerage
activities of registered representatives participating in the networking arrangement. 0 3 The broker-dealer may now provide commercially available
research materials and investment information to customers on the premises
of the depository institution. "
97. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1988).
98. Savings Ass'n Inv. Sec., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 90.
99. Rule 15c3-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1991).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(6) (1988).
101. Savings Ass'n Inv. Sec., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 90.
102. Collateral Fin. Brokerage, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
743 (June 7, 1989).

103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Moore & Schley, Cameron & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 SEC NoAct. LEXIS 1282 (May 19, 1989).
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As the staff has acquired experience with the operation of these arrangements, other conditions have become more specific. The employees of the
depository institutions may only perform clerical or ministerial duties.
These include helping customers fill out account forms, reviewing the forms
for completeness, and forwarding them to the broker-dealer at the customers' request. The employees may distribute information about the brokerdealer, but they are prohibited from recommending securities, providing investment advice, or handling any questions requiring familiarity with the
securities industry or the exercise of judgment. Depository institution employees continue to be prohibited from accepting or transmitting orders or
funds; however, they are permitted to make electronic transfers of funds between customers' accounts with the depository institutions and their accounts with the broker dealer.105
The broker-dealer and the depository institutions now must take positive
steps to ensure adherence to compliance manuals governing the conduct of
the parties to the arrangement. The depository institutions may prepare advertising and informational and promotional materials, as long as the broker-dealer approves them before distribution. It is no longer necessary for
these materials to describe the depository institution solely as the place
where brokerage services are provided. Although a complete analysis of the
no-action letters concerning depository institution networking is beyond the
scope of this article, a brief treatment of the topic has been included to
demonstrate that the rationale for those letters is the same as that underlying
the finders' no-action letters. 106
D. Common-Interest Groups
Other business or social organizations, such as clubs or trade associations,
also can serve as a fertile source of referrals to broker-dealers. The relatively
close ties among members, the ease of disseminating information to them,
and the likelihood of members being receptive to the organization's recommendations apparently have provided sufficient incentive for broker-dealers
to enlist the aid of these groups. The broker-dealer obtains brokerage business from group members in return for a fee, and sometimes for a share of
commissions. These requests have not always found favor with the staff."7
For purposes of classification, this article refers to such organizations as
common-interest groups.
105. Id.
106. See supra notes 90-104 and accompanying text.
107. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
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1. Thrift Institution Leagues
Thrift institution league arrangements closely resemble the depository institution networking arrangements discussed above.' 0 8 Two leagues of state
savings and loan associations received no-action positions allowing them to
promote the discount brokerage services of registered broker-dealers to
league members.'0 9 All purchases or sales of securities, however, were to be
transacted by the broker-dealers directly with customers of league members.
Joint employees of the leagues and the broker-dealers would distribute literature to league members, familiarize them with the benefits of participation,
and encourage them to conclude agreements with the broker-dealers, to
which the leagues would not be parties. The broker-dealers would review
and approve all advertising. These joint employees would be supervised by
the broker-dealers but compensated by the leagues. Neither the joint employees nor the leagues would have dealings with the securities customers or
any involvement in securities transactions. The joint employees would not
receive any commissions or other compensation relating to the brokerage
business provided to the broker-dealers by customers of the leagues' members. Instead, the leagues themselves would receive a percentage of the gross
brokerage commissions.1 0
The payment of commissions raises an apparent contradiction. Networking no-action letters have permitted savings and loan associations and credit
unions to receive commissions. The staff has noted that these institutions
are depository institutions, like banks, which are statutorily excluded from
the definition of broker.'1 A league of depository institutions is not itself a
depository institution. The staff has resolved this contradiction, however, in
a recent no-action letter concerning a state league of credit unions." 2 The
league proposed to perform activities similar to those in the earlier letters,
and counsel's initial letter stated that the broker-dealer would give a percentage of gross commissions to the league." 3
The staff's response indicates that this proposal was rejected. The response does not allow for commissions, but instead, sanctions other pay108. See supra notes 90-106 and accompanying text.

109. BSLA Sec., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2448 (Feb. 27,
1984); GIT Inv. Servs., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2888 (Aug.
30, 1983).
110. Id.
111. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
112.

Moore & Schley, Cameron & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 104 (proposing

to advise league members of the availability of a registered broker-dealer's services to customers of league members).

113. Id.
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ments by the broker-dealer to the league.114 In the first year of the
arrangement the broker-dealer pays a flat monthly fee, not to exceed $300, in
return for the league's administrative services. This fee may be increased in
later years as administrative services rise in proportion to the number of
participating league members.' 15 When considered with the Colonial Equities no-action letter discussed above," 6 this letter shows the extreme depths
to which the staff may probe in order to determine whether a finder will
receive, directly or indirectly, any transaction-based compensation, regardless of how the compensation is denominated.' 17
2. Nonprofit Organizations
Nonprofit organizations occasionally have proposed to make their members aware of the services available from registered broker-dealers."" The
organizations propose to arrange for meetings, make announcements in their
publications, provide mailing lists of their members, assist in the preparation
and dissemination of informational materials, and allow their logos to appear on those materials. They refer all inquiries from their members to broker-dealers and avoid handling their members' funds or securities, accepting
orders, and recommending securities."'
At first, these no-action positions appear justified, on the grounds that
these activities are more informational than transactional in nature. The
compensation received by these organizations, however, evidences a departure from the staff's "no commission" rule. 120 Allowable compensation has
included twenty percent of the broker-dealer's advisory fees (one-half of one114. Id.
115. Id. The broker-dealer may pay a supplemental flat monthly fee for each league member that joins the program, although this fee will not vary with the size of league membership,
the volume of securities transactions from its customers, or the amount of commissions from
those transactions. The supplemental fee cannot be modified, and it will not be greater than
$100. Id.
116. Supra notes 60, 64-66, 68 and accompanying text.

117. Moore & Schley, Cameron & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 104. One recent
commentator seemingly has glossed over this important point. See Crespi, supra note 14, at

345-46 ("As a general matter, a person may find prospective securities purchasers and introduce them to prospective sellers, introduce prospective purchasers to prospective lenders to
finance securities transactions, act as a consultant to sellers regarding the terms of a securities
sale, and receive transaction-based compensation for those services, without being required to
register.")
118. Security Pacific Brokers, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
1961 (Mar. 5, 1985); Ewing Capital, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
1597 (Jan. 25, 1985); National School Bds. Ass'n, SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 1797 (Feb. 18, 1984).

119. See supra note 117.
120. See supra note 75.
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percent of assets under management) from accounts opened by members 21
and an outright percentage of commissions earned on members' brokerage
transactions. 122 There appears to be no reason grounded in securities law
for distinguishing these organizations from other groups, such as thrift institution leagues, that perform the same activities. The staff appears to have
been inordinately influenced by the nonprofit status of these
23
organizations. 1
3.

Other Organizations

Two other types of common-interest groups deserve mention: service organizations124 and affinity groups. 125 These groups have been good sources
of new retail customers for broker-dealers. They have been permitted to
perform informational and promotional services similar to those already discussed. 12 6 In fact, one set of affinity groups was permitted to send new account application forms to their members, which could be returned by direct
mail to the broker-dealer. 127 Once again, despite the fact that these organizations and groups received a share of the commissions generated by members' securities transactions, the staff took no-action positions.128
The no-action letters permitting common-interest groups to receive transaction-based compensation for acting as finders may represent an expansion
of the networking concept beyond the scope of its original application to
depository institutions.1 29 While it is sometimes possible to glean the staff's
legal views from the way in which it exercises its prosecutorial discretion,
the staff's silence on this point may be susceptible to differing
interpretations.
E.

Related Commission Decisions

The Commission's own decisions concerning finders are somewhat more
enlightening. First, it is worth noting that registered broker-dealers are ac121. National School Bds. Ass'n, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 118.
122. Security Pacific Brokers, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 118; Ewing Capital, SEC
No-Action Letter, supra note 118.
123. These nonprofit organizations included school districts and educational and charitable
organizations.
124. See, e.g., Security Pacific Brokers, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 2700 (June 20, 1985).
125. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2509 (June 9, 1987).
126. See supra notes 108, 123 and accompanying text.
127. Merrill Lynch, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 125.
128. See supra notes 124-25.
129. See supra notes 90-105 and accompanying text.
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countable for "all violations of the federal securities laws committed by any
person employed by [the broker-dealer] in any capacity; or by any other
individual who effects or induces transactions in securities for the registrant
,,130 The NASD has the authority to discipline its members both for
....
violations of its own rules and for violations of the statutory and regulatory
the Commission
provisions of the federal securities laws. 131 Furthermore,
132
appeal.
on
sanctions
those
has the authority to review
One recent case involved associated persons of NASD member firms who
engaged in private securities transactions without giving the required prior
written notification to their employers. 133 In that case, the Commission affirmed the NASD's sanctions when it rejected the argument that an associated person did not effect the transactions in question. The associated
person argued that he merely referred the firm's customers to the syndicator
of certain limited partnerships in return for finder's fees. 134 The Commission noted, however, that this associated person repeatedly recommended
that his clients invest in these limited partnerships, gave them the syndicator's name if they expressed interest, and actually received commissions
from the syndicator after some of the clients purchased limited partnership
interests.135 The Commission did not discuss whether the broker-dealer registration requirements would apply to any of the associated persons if they
were operating outside the scope of their employment with the NASD member.' 36 The Commission's and NASD's use of these findings, however, could
130.

WEISS,

supra note 4, at 34 (footnotes omitted).

131. NASD By-Laws, Art. XIV, § 1, reprinted in NASD Manual (CCH)

1271 (Apr.

1991).
132. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d)-(f) (1988).
133. Allen S. Klosowski, Exchange Act Release No. 25,467, 40 SEC Docket 783 (Mar. 15,
1988).
The NASD prohibits any person associated with an NASD member firm from participating
in a securities transaction outside the scope of the person's employment with the firm unless,
among other things, the person gives the firm prior written notification describing the proposed transaction in detail, including the compensation that the person anticipates receiving.
NASD Rules of Fair Practice, Art. III, § 40(a)-(b), reprinted in NASD Manual (CCH) 2200
(July 1988); see also SEC v. Ridenour, 913 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that an account
executive in the bond department of a brokerage firm violated broker-dealer registration requirements, because the high level of his activity involving securities transactions exceeded
that of merely an active investor, and because he maintained regular clients for private bond
transactions negotiated from the firm's offices but for his own account). The Commission also
instituted administrative proceedings against Ridenour, in which he was barred from association with any broker or dealer. Robert L. Ridenour, Exchange Act Release No. 29,184, 48
SEC Docket 1345 (May 9, 1991).
134. Allen S. Klosowski, supra note 133.
135. Id.
136. Id.; see also The Cambridge Group, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 29,795, 49 SEC
Docket 1810 (Oct. 8, 1991).
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help turn aside a finder's argument that referring potential purchasers of
securities in return for commissions does not amount to effecting transac137

tions in securities.
Another way to glean the Commission's attitude toward finders is to review cases in which the Commission bars persons from associating with registered broker-dealers. In at least two decisions, the Commission barred
persons from such association, a sanction that effectively prevented those
persons from engaging in the securities business, while at the same time permitting them to act as finders. 138 On an earlier occasion, the Commission
permitted, over the staff's public objections, the continued membership in
the NASD of a brokerage firm employing a person who had caused the revocation of another broker-dealer's registration and the expulsion of that broker-dealer from the NASD for antifraud violations. 1 39 Under the managing
partner's supervision, the person's duties would consist of finding companies
requiring financial advice that the firm might be able to provide, making the
initial contacts, and turning over prospects to the managing partner for

handling. 4
137. The staff reiterated its own views in a recent letter responding to an inquiry from a
branch manager of a registered broker-dealer, who proposed to act in the United States as a
finder for unregistered foreign broker-dealers. Richard D. VandenBerg, SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1221 (Sept. 5, 1990). The branch manager proposed to hold
seminars, disseminate information, and refer potential customers to the foreign broker-dealers.
The staff warned that if this finder's activities exceeded the scope of his duties for the registered
broker-dealer, he himself could be deemed to be an unregistered broker-dealer. The staff added that the finder's activities would result in the foreign broker-dealers being required to
register as well.
138. Steven R. Tatusko, Exchange Act Release No. 21,849, 32 SEC Docket 858 (Mar. 13,
1985) (finding that respondent could continue association with current employer if he acted
only as a finder of other broker-dealers that would attempt, through private placements, to sell
interests in enterprises in which the employer was the general partner); IMH Sec. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 10,543, 3 SEC Docket 208 (Dec. 7, 1973) (allowing respondent to act
as "go-between, middleman or finder" between issuers and underwriters of exempt securities).
139. Robert Edelstein, Exchange Act Release No. 8159, 1967 SEC LEXIS 547, 548 (Sept.
18, 1967). Under section 15A(g)(2) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(g)(2) (1988), the
NASD may "deny membership to any registered (broker-dealer], and bar from [association]
with a member any person ....
subject to a statutory disqualification." Also, the NASD is
required to notify the Commission prior to admitting to membership any registered brokerdealer, or prior to permitting to become associated with a member any person, subject to a
statutory disqualification. The term "statutory disqualification" is defined in section 3(a)(39)
of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(39)(1988).
140. Robert Edelstein, Exchange Act Release, supra note 139. In Van Alstyne, Noel &
Co., 43 S.E.C. 1080 (1969), the Commission imposed sanctions on a broker-dealer with an
associated person who received a retainer fee for finding underwriting opportunities for the
broker-dealer. The person had committed willful violations of the federal securities laws prior
to association with the broker-dealer, and he was permanently enjoined from committing other
violations during association. The broker-dealer had not amended its registration application
with the Commission to disclose this person's identity and disciplinary history. Id. The sanc-
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It is possible to infer that the Commission did not consider these activities
to be within the scope of effecting securities transactions and, therefore, considered them properly outside the scope of the sanctions in these cases.
There was no discussion, however, in any of these cases of whether the permitted activities themselves would require broker-dealer registration. Moreover, any perceived leniency in the application of the broker-dealer
registration requirements to these finders is dispelled by the fact that the
activities were performed by persons employed by, and under the supervision of, registered broker-dealers. One of the chief risks incurred in allowing
finders to remain unregistered is the absence of this supervision and control.
In one recent case, TraigerEnergy Investments, however, the Commission
addressed the status of finders more directly, though still in the context of
association with a registered broker-dealer.1 4 An NASD member firm,
which was an underwriter for a private offering of oil and gas limited partnerships, paid finder's fees to persons who referred to the firm other persons
who ultimately purchased the limited partnership interests being offered.
The Commission set aside the NASD's sanctions against the member firm
1 42
for failing to register the finders with the NASD as associated persons.
The decision may be more of a testament to the NASD's failure to put on
sufficient proof than an indication of leniency on the part of the Commission
toward finders. The Commission's decision expressly referred to the lack of
evidence demonstrating that the finders repeatedly referred prospective purchasers, made any sales pitch or recommendation, or had any contact at all
with prospective purchasers. 143 Indeed, the bare factual record allowed for
the possibility that the finders merely may have on one occasion submitted a
list of names to the member firm. Thus, even though the finders received
fees equal to five percent of the initial investments made by persons that they
tions were imposed only on the broker-dealer, and the Commission did not discuss whether the
person's activities would require broker-dealer registration, most likely because this person's

association with the broker-dealer would subject him to the firm's supervision and control.
Under section 15(b)(4)(E)(i)-(ii) of the Exchange Act, broker-dealers are subject to sanctions
by the Commission for failing reasonably to supervise their associated persons who commit
violations of the statutory or regulatory provisions of the federal securities laws, unless there
were established procedures, and a system for applying them, that "would reasonably be expected to prevent and detect [the violations], insofar as practicable," and the broker-dealers
have "reasonably discharged [their] duties and obligations ...

[under] such procedures and

system without reasonable cause to believe that such procedures and system were not being
complied with." 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E)(i)-(ii) (1988).
141. Traiger Energy Invs., Exchange Act Release No. 25,306, 40 SEC Docket 185 (Feb. 3,
1988).
142. Id. at 186-87.
143. Id.
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referred, the Commission held that the finders were not engaged in the securities business on behalf of the firm. 44
By not requiring these finders to be associated persons of a registered broker-dealer, the Commission may have intended to imply that their activities
did not require broker-dealer registration. If so, the decision does not reflect
sound policy. Persons receiving compensation based on the outcome of a
transaction have a powerful incentive to do whatever is necessary to make
that transaction succeed. The compensation received by the finders in
Traiger provided that incentive, and it could have been a sufficient basis
upon which to affirm the NASD's sanctions. By contrast, there was simply
no evidence that those finders actually did engage in conduct beyond the
scope of their limited activities, which is the danger in any finder's arrangement. It thus may be implied that the Commission apparently would not
agree that receipt of transaction-based compensation alone would cause a
person to be deemed a broker-dealer. 145 It also may be possible, however, to
regard the Traiger decision as being limited to its facts, or rather, lack of
46
facts. 1
F. Analysis
In essence, the finders described above have argued to the staff, and sometimes to the Commission, that they have not effected securities transactions,
but merely referred interested persons to registered broker-dealers who effected any resulting transactions. In most cases, that argument has proven
to be too narrow. The Commission historically has held that effecting transactions includes more than merely performing the physical actions necessary
to complete those transactions. For example, when an intrastate brokerdealer mailed circulars, securities, and confirmations beyond state borders,
the Commission held that broker-dealer registration was required, rejecting
the argument that the registration requirements of section 15(a) of the Ex144. Id. at 187. The NASD requires that persons associated with a member firm "who are
engaged in the investment banking or securities business for the member" must be "registered

as such with the [NASD]." NASD Schedules to By-Laws, Schedule C, Part III, § l(a), reprinted in NASD Manual (CCH) 1753, at 1542 (Apr. 1991).
145. See McGivney Securities, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 78 and accompanying
text.
146. Certainly, the strong condemnation of very similar arguments made by the associated
person in Allen S. Klosowski, supra note 133 and accompanying text, supports this reading.
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change Act 147 applied "only to the actual consummation of the purchase or
I48
sale of securities" outside state borders.
In the context of interpreting section 11 (a) of the Exchange Act, 149 the
Commission also has indicated that the term "effect" should be broadly construed. In a 1976 release, the Commission stated that an exchange member
would "effect" a transaction, for the purposes of section 11(a), "even though
the services of another [exchange] member [were] utilized to execute the
transaction."' 150 In a subsequent release, the Commission rejected arguments that it was interpreting "effect" too broadly, because the word was not
qualified in section 11(a) by the phrase "directly or indirectly."''
The
Commission explained that, while "effect" is modified by the phrase "directly or indirectly" in several places in the Exchange Act,'" 2 "the word
'effect,' and its cognates, are more often used alone, in contexts (other than
Section 11(a)) where a constricted interpretationwould be wholly inappropriate," specifically citing section 3(a)(4) and section 15(a), among other
53
provisions.1
Arguments that referral activities were not the finders' principal business
also have been rejected. In effect, there is no "de minimus" exception from
broker-dealer registration.154 This position is sound, as it avoids the trouble147. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (1988). Section 15(a)(l) states, in pertinent part, that:
It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer... (other than such a broker or dealer
whose business is exclusively intrastate and who does not make use of any facility of
a national securities exchange) to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect any transactionsin, or to induce or attempt to
induce the purchase or sale of, any security ... unless such broker or dealer is registered [with the Commission].
Id. (emphasis added).
148. Securities Exch. Corp., 2 S.E.C. 760, 762 (1937) (emphasis added).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 78k(a) (1988).
150. Exchange Act Release No. 12,055, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 80,367, at 85,974 (Jan. 27, 1976).
151. Exchange Act Release No. 13,388, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 81,013, at 87,698 (Mar. 18, 1977).
152. See, e.g., Exchange Act, §§ 5, 9(a), 30, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78e, 78i(a), 78dd (1988).
153. Exchange Act Release No. 13,388, supra note 151, at 87,698 (emphasis added). The
Commission also noted that "the Congress added qualifying phrases in other sections where a
narrower meaning was intended," including sections 3(a)(3), 6(c)(4), 6(f)(1), and 6(0(2) of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(3), 78f(c)(4), 78f(f)(l), 78f(0(2) (1988). Id.
154. WEISS, supra note 4, at 7-8 (footnote omitted). Weiss stated that:
[T]here is nothing in the definitions of broker and dealer which would warrant a
conclusion that a person cannot be engaged in the business in respect of securities
merely because such business is only a minor part of the person's activities or merely
because the income from it represents only a small fraction of his total income. On
the contrary, if the activity is engaged in for commissions or other compensation
with sufficient recurrence to justify the inference that the activity is part of the per-
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some administrative problem of trying to set a fixed, acceptable level of broker-dealer activity by unregistered persons.
I There is one judicial decision in the broker-dealer area that, by analogy,
appears to provide some guidance.' 55 A discount brokerage firm,' 56 which
was a NASD member, appealed the Commission's order upholding the
NASD's decision requiring the firm to register persons who only took orders
from customers' 57 as general securities representatives. The broker-dealer
argued that the order-takers performed only clerical and ministerial functions. The NASD, however, reasoned that order-taking was more than a
clerical or ministerial act, and that the regular and continuous contact of
these persons with the public warranted registration. The Commission
found that the order-takers had to be familiar with the securities business
and able to answer questions competently. Therefore, the Commission deferred to the NASD's long-standing policy of requiring anyone taking orders
from the public to register.' 58
The appellate court, in upholding the Commission's order, found that the
regular and continuous contact of the order-takers with the public was a
reasonable rationale for the NASD's policy.' 5 9 The court deferred to the
Commission's expertise on what would be in the public interest, noting that
these "personnel may stray from their limited duties during public contact
resulting in harm to investors."'' This case was decided on the question of
what constituted clerical and ministerial activity, rather than whether the
order-takers were engaged in the business of effecting securities transactions.
Nevertheless, the issues raised by regular and continuous public contact, and
the harm that could result if so-called "limited" duties were disregarded,
son's business, he will be deemed to be "engaged in the business" within the meaning
of that term as used in the definitions of broker and dealer.

Id.; see also JAFFE, supra note 52, § 2.04, at 20 n.32 ("[T]he registration requirements apply
whether or not a person is an amateur or professional and whether or not employment in the
securities business is on a full or part-time basis.") (citing Boruski v. SEC, 289 F.2d 738, 740
(2d Cir. 1961) (dictum)).
155. Exchange Servs. Inc. v. SEC., 797 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1986).
156. A "discount broker" typically executes trades at commission rates sharply lower than
those charged by a "full service broker." The discount broker does not provide any of the
other services generally offered by a full service broker, such as making recommendations to
buy or sell particular securities, asset management, advice on financial planning and tax shelters, and the opportunity to purchase new issues of securities. JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN
ELLIOT GOODMAN, BARRON'S DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS

(2d ed.
157.
158.
159.
160.

1985) (Barron's).
Exchange Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 797 F.2d at 188.
Id. at 189.
Id. at 190-91.
Id. at 190.
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invites a favorable comparison with finders referring investors to brokerdealers, and suggests equally strict scrutiny and, if necessary, regulation. 6 '
IV.

REFERRING INVESTORS TO ISSUERS

A second major class of finders engages in activities designed to assist
issuers seeking financing by referring potential investors directly to those issuers.' 6 2 These finders include persons who promote the sale of a new issue
of securities,' 6 3 financial advisers who provide consulting services regarding
the issuance of securities, persons who facilitate merger and acquisition activities, so-called "business brokers," and persons who match investors with
Many of these finders have received noentrepreneurs seeking financing.'
action positions from the staff. The staff's negative responses, however, are
more instructive, as they more clearly reflect the boundaries of the permissible activities of these finders.
161. In fact, the NASD sought comments on a proposed amendment to Schedule C of its
by-laws restricting the payment of finder's fees or referral fees by NASD members to unregistered third parties for referral of retail business. Fees paid in connection with underwriting or
merger and acquisition activities would be permitted, however, and occasional fixed-amount
referral fees also would be allowed. See NASD Notice to Members No. 89-3 (Jan. 1989). To
date, the NASD has not formally filed this amendment with the Commission as a proposed
rule change.
162. See Don Augustine & Peter Fass, Finder'sFees in Security and Real Estate Transactions, 35 Bus. LAW. 485 (1980).
163. Item 508(i) of Regulation S-K requires issuers, in registration statements filed with the
Commission, to "[i]dentify any finder and, if applicable, describe the nature of any material
relationship between such finder and the registrant, its officers, directors, principal stockholders, finders or promoters or the principal underwriter(s), or if there is a managing underwriter(s), the managing underwriter(s) (including, in each case, affiliates or associates
thereof)." 17 C.F.R. § 229.508(i) (1991).
164. One distinct group of persons referring investors to issuers will not be discussed in this
paper: directors, officers, or employees of issuers who sell only that issuer's securities to the
public. The Commission has adopted Rule 3a4-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a4-1 (1991), to exempt
these persons from the definition of broker upon certain conditions. To claim the exemption,
these persons must not: (i) be subject to a statutory disqualification; (ii) receive transactionbased compensation; or (iii) be associated persons of a registered broker-dealer. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.3a4-1(a)(1)-(3) (1991). These persons may sell the issuer's securities in three different
ways. First, they may sell to specified institutions (the "financial institutions" prong of the
rule). Second, they may sell to the public in general, if they perform substantial other duties
for the issuer, were not associated with a broker-dealer during the preceding 12 months, and
do not participate in an offering of the issuer's securities more than once every 12 months,
except in reliance on the other prongs in the rule (the "active sales" prong). Third, they may
sell by merely preparing written communications, responding to investors' inquiries, and performing clerical and ministerial activities (the "passive sales" prong). 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a4l(a)(4) (1991).
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A. Sale of New Issues of Securities
The staff has taken several no-action positions regarding the activities of
persons who proposed to refer investors to issuers in connection with the sale
of new issues of securities, 6 5 including associations of investors.' 6 6 For the
most part, these persons or organizations genuinely appear to have done
nothing more than bring interested parties together or refer potential investors to issuers, without participating in any negotiations between the two.
On at least one occasion, however, such a finder obtained a staff no-action
position, despite receipt of a fee based on a percentage of the amount in67
vested by the referred persons.'
More recently, the staff responded to an interesting request from a finder
who proposed to locate investors for a new Canadian hockey team trying to
raise money through an offering of limited partnership units in the United
States and Canada.' 68 The finder wanted to contact potential investors
among his business and personal associates in return for a commission on
sales to any persons whom he had contacted. The staff's response, however,
indicates that the finder was limited to sending the hockey team a list of
potential investors rather than contacting them himself.' 69 Thus, the
finder's receipt of transaction-based compensation may not have been
deemed an incentive to engage in abusive sales practices, because the finder
would have no contact at all with prospective investors. Moreover, the
finder represented that he had never acted as a finder before and would not
do so again.
Conversely, the staff has denied no-action positions based on both the
finders' proposed activities and their compensation.' 71 If the finder pro165. See, e.g., Charles H. Swanke, SEC No-Action Letter, 1980 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 3376
(May 6, 1980); Moana/Kauai Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 63
(July 10, 1974).
166. See, e.g., Northeastern Pa. Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Am., SEC
No-Action Letter, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 78,697 (Mar. 31,
1988) (investment committee for congregations within synod); Delaware Inv. Found., SEC
No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 3069 (Nov. 6, 1986) (association of local construction industry pension trusts); Florida Affirmative Inv. Roundtable, SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2722 (July 21, 1983) (same); Tri-State Inv. Found., SEC NoAction Letter, 1982 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2844 (Aug. 5, 1982) (same); Construction Indus.
Real Estate Dev. Fin. Found. of S. Cal., SEC No-Action Letter, 1980 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
4016 (Oct. 2, 1980) (same).
167. Moana/Kauai Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 165.
168. Paul Anka, SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 925 (July 26, 1991).
169. Cf Traiger Energy Invs., Exchange Act Release, supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text (finders merely may have submitted a list of names of potential investors to the NASD
member firm).
170. See, e.g., Richard S. Appel, SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 No-Act. LEXIS 2035 (Jan.
13, 1983); John DiMeno, SEC No-Action Letter, 1978 No-Act. LEXIS 2188 (Oct. 11, 1978);
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posed to advertise bid and asked quotations in the issuer's securities' 7 ' or
72
received compensation based on a percentage of funds loaned or invested,
the staff apparently felt that the boundaries of broker-dealer activity had
been crossed. 173 On occasion, the Commission has authorized the bringing
received fees for locatof enforcement actions against "investor finders" who
7
ing potential purchasers of an issuer's securities.' 1
B. FinancialAdvisers
The staff also has taken no-action positions regarding the activities of persons proposing to act as financial advisers to businesses in connection with
the issuance of securities.' 75 These persons generally would provide market
and financial analyses, prepare feasibility studies, hold meetings with registered broker-dealers, prepare or supervise the preparation of registration
statements and offering memoranda, and otherwise assist the issuer in structuring the offering. The staff, however, has required broker-dealer registraticn of these persons if they received compensation based on the outcome of
Sidney Marks, SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 No-Act. LEXIS 2057 (July 7, 1977); General
Stock Transfer Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 78,402 (Aug. 4, 1971).
171. General Stock Transfer Co., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 170.
172. Sidney Marks, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 170; John DiMeno, SEC No-Action
Letter, supra note 170; Richard S. Appel, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 170.
173. In one interesting case, a finder who claimed that he would avoid participating in
negotiations, but would receive a five percent commission, pressed the staff for reconsideration
of the denial of his no-action request. John DiMeno, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 170.
Counsel apparently persuaded the staff to relent by arguing that the finder had not engaged,
and would not in the future engage, in any other efforts to locate investors for issuers. John
DiMeno, SEC No-Action Letter, 1979 No-Act. LEXIS 2791 (Mar. 2, 1979); cf Paul Anka,
SEC No-Action Letter, supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., SEC v. Miller Fin. Corp., Litigation Release No. 10,537, 31 SEC Docket
514 (Sept. 20, 1984) (finders consented to permanent injunction against violation of section
15(a)); SEC v. Solomon, Litigation Release No. 10,078, 28 SEC Docket 552 (July 26, 1983) (no
reported decision); SEC v. Reliance Capital Corp., Litigation Release No. 5365, 1972 SEC
LEXIS 1633 (Mar. 30, 1972) (no reported decision).
175. See, e.g., Vincent Forma, SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 3075
(Oct. 11, 1985); Dominion Resources, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
2511 (July 23, 1985); Columbia Transfer Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1976 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 1245 (May 28, 1976) (inviting broker-dealers to join together to act as co-underwriters
in proposed offerings); Albert Pitts, SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 440
(Jan. 27, 1975).
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the offering or the amount of financing raised, 1 76 or if they participated in
177
negotiations between the issuer and investors.
C.

Mergers and Acquisitions

Arranging mergers and acquisitions is an area in which finders seem particularly active. These finders may be deemed to effect securities transactions if the mergers or acquisitions are accomplished through the issuance,
transfer, or exchange of securities.'7 8 Surprisingly, however, there are very
few staff no-action letters on this topic.
Many of the staff's letters consist only of general statements of law and
expressly refrain from taking no-action positions.' 79 The staff has emphasized that if there were a distribution or an exchange of securities in connection with the merger or acquisition, broker-dealer registration would be
required."SO In addition, persons receiving a commission for their efforts,
based on the cost of the securities exchanged or on the amount of securities
176. Thomas J. DiBiase, SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 440 (Jan. 18,
1988); Capital Directions, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1979 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2051 (Jan.
4, 1979); Gunnar/Burkhart/Armstrong & Assocs., SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 2617 (Oct. 28, 1975).
177. See, e.g., Capital Directions, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 176; R.T. Madden & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1976 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2240 (Sept. 17, 1976); Gunnar/
Burkhart/Armstrong & Assocs., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 176.
178. In SEC v. Century Inv. Transfer Corp., No. 71 Civ. 3384, [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 93,232 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 1971), the defendant company
acted as a broker for purchasers and sellers of shell corporations. The company solicited customers through newspaper advertisements. It sought to effect mergers between privately-held
corporations and publicly-held shell corporations controlled by an affiliate. Although there
was no mention of the defendant's compensation for these activities, a preliminary injunction
against violations of the broker-dealer registration requirements was granted. Id.
In an unrelated private action, a plaintiff sued to void his agreement with defendant, a
merger and acquisitions specialist, because the merger took too long to arrange and defendant
refused to reduce his fee. In its unpublished decision, Snyder v. McGuire, Civil Action No.
CA-3-82-1453-D (N.D. Tex. June 30, 1983), the court granted summary judgment for plaintiff.
The court reasoned that: the contract involved a securities transaction; defendant was a broker
because he was in the business of buying and selling securities for the account of others; defendant attempted to induce the purchase of securities by others to raise funds for plaintiff's
acquisition; and defendant was not registered with the Commission. The court relied on section 29(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1988), the rationale in Regional Properties, Inc. v. Financial & Real Estate Consulting Co., 678 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1982), and some of
the staff no-action letters in this area.
179. See, e.g., Prescott-Gross & Assocs., SEC Interpretative Letter, 1980 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 2637 (Jan. 11, 1980); IMF Corp., SEC Interpretative Letter, 1978 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 1246 (May 15, 1978); The Executive Suite, SEC Interpretative Letter, 1975 SEC NoAct. LEXIS 1740 (Aug. 20, 1975); Philip Roman, SEC Interpretative Letter (June 28, 1974);

Ruth Quigley, SEC Interpretative Letter, 1973 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 3177 (July 14, 1973).
180. See supra note 179.
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placed, also would be deemed brokers or dealers.1 8 ' On the other hand,
individuals who only bring together merger or acquisition-minded persons
and who do not participate, directly or indirectly, in the distribution of securities, or share in the profits realized, likely would not be deemed brokers
or dealers and would not be required to register. The staff also has found it
between the
important that the finder not participate in any negotiations
18 2
together.
them
bringing
finder
the
to
subsequent
parties
The staff has denied a few no-action requests regarding merger and acquisition finders.' 83 Perhaps the most representative letter involved a private
investment banking firm acting principally as an intermediary for companies
seeking venture capital and permanent financing.'8 4 The firm acted as a consultant regarding mergers and asset sales, reviewed financial reports, and
advised management on financial decisions. The firm received commissions
based on the price at which a transaction was consummated and occasionally participated in negotiations concerning the transaction. Emphasizing
the firm's participation in negotiations, the staff determined that brokerdealer registration would be required.' 85
In a later letter, May-Pac Management Company, a consulting firm specializing in mergers and acquisitions, proposed to bring together potential
buyers and sellers of corporations in order to complete a transaction. 8 6 The
firm would participate in negotiations between the parties and receive compensation based on a percentage of the transaction price obtained for the
selling or merging client. Not surprisingly, the staff responded that persons
who play an integral role in negotiating and effecting mergers or acquisitions
that involve transactions in securities would be required to register as broker-dealers.'8 7 Therefore, if the consulting firm's proposed activities included securities transactions, registration would be required. r88 The denial
of this no-action request on this topic provoked negative comments from the
securities bar.
181. Id.
182. Id. The staff has taken care to exclude from the reach of this prohibition, however,

professional advisers, such as lawyers or accountants, acting in their respective capacities. The
Executive Suite, SEC Interpretative Letter, supra note 179.
183. See WOLFSON ET AL., supra note 62, § 1.10.
184. Fulham & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1972 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 4488 (Nov.
21, 1972).
185. Id.
186. May-Pac Management Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1117
(Nov. 20, 1973).
187. Id.
188. Id.
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A subcommittee of the Chicago Bar Association wrote to the staff, urging
that registration not be required in certain circumstances.' 8 9 These included
occasions when a finder's merger and acquisition activities were limited to
bringing persons together and participating in their negotiations, only to the
extent of negotiating the finder's compensation and keeping the parties negotiating to complete the transaction. Counsel argued that these finders should
be deemed to effect transactions, and be required to register, only when they
had the authority to consummate the transactions and bind their principals
within the scope of the principals' instructions. The staff responded that the
May-Pac Management Company letter was consistent with previous staff positions and contemporaneous case law.' 90 The staff also maintained that the
factors mentioned by counsel would not be determinative in all cases.' 9 '
This response seems correct. While counsel may have construed properly
the meaning of effecting transactions under the law of agency, the scope of
effecting transactions within the context of the federal securities laws is
192
much broader.
D. Business Brokers
A related group of finders engages in the business of bringing together
buyers and sellers of businesses. 9' In this area, the staff also has issued
more general statements than no-action letters, most likely due to the factintensive nature of the question of whether these finders are acting as brokers.' 94 The staff has stressed that these finders should avoid holding clients'
securities, giving investment advice, or counseling prospective buyers or sell189. Paul B. Uhlenhop, Esq., SEC Interpretative Letter (Apr. 1, 1975).
190. See SEC v. Century Inv. Transfer Corp., No. 71 Civ. 3384, [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. § 93,232 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 1971).

191. Id.
192. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
193. See Michael Bamberger, Sales of Businesses - When Are Business Brokers Securities
Brokers?, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 309 (1988). In Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681

(1985), the Supreme Court held that the sale of a business by means of transferring ownership
of all of a company's stock constituted a securities transaction entitled to the protection of the
federal securities laws. The federal circuit courts had been divided over this question, which

was known as the "sale of business" doctrine. See, e.g., Stephen J. Easly, Recent Developments
in the Sale of Business Doctrine: Toward a Transactional Context-Based Analysis for Federal
Securities Jurisdiction, 39 Bus. LAW. 929 (1984).
194. See, e.g., Wesco Equity Funding, SEC Interpretative Letter, 1985 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 2634 (Aug. 10, 1985); Garrett/Kushell/Associates, SEC Interpretative Letter, 1980
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 3744 (Sept. 7, 1980); Castagan Business Brokerage, Inc., SEC Interpretative Letter, 1980 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 3298 (May 15, 1980); Gary L. Pleger, Esq., SEC Interpretative Letter, 1977 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2491 (Oct. 11, 1977); Bay Business Serv., SEC
Interpretative Letter, 1977 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 642 (Mar. 14, 1977); Dennis L. Whitman,
Esq., SEC Interpretative Letter (Jan. 23, 1974).
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ers.'9' The same factors applied to merger and acquisition finders have been
deemed relevant in this context. The factors include the permissibility of
bringing together persons interested in buying or selling businesses and the
impermissibility of playing an integral role in negotiating and effecting
purchases or sales of businesses involving securities transactions. 196 Particular emphasis also has been placed on receipt of compensation based on the
cost or value of securities involved in the purchase or sale.'

97

Apparently, the staff has issued only two no-action positions on this
topic.' 98 The absence of any additional letters since these were issued may
indicate that the staff would prefer counsel to be guided by the statements in
those letters rather than request individual no-action positions. Indeed, the
no-action letter to International Business Exchange Corporation sets out a
definitive list of the factors that the staff believes should be considered in
determining whether a business broker should register as a broker-dealer
with the Commission. These factors include whether:
(i) the business broker plays only a limited role in negotiations
between the parties;
(ii) the businesses bought and sold are going concerns and not
shells;
(iii) only assets are advertised or offered for sale;
(iv) any transactions in securities involve the transfer of all the
equity in the business to a single purchaser or group formed
without the business broker's assistance;
(v) the business broker gives no advice whether to issue securities
or regarding their value;
(vi) the business broker's compensation does not vary with the
form of conveyance; and
(vii) the business broker provides no assistance in obtaining financing, except for providing lists of potential lenders. 199
On the whole, these factors define the staff's view on the limits of business
brokers' permissible activities in light of the broker-dealer registration re195. See supra note 193.
196. See supra note 194. As with merger and acquisition finders, see supra note 136 and
accompanying text, the staff has excluded from this analysis professional advisers, such as
lawyers and accountants, acting in their professional capacities, even though they undeniably
can play an integral role in consummating the purchase or sale of a business. Garrett/
Kushell/Associates, SEC Interpretative Letter, supra note 194.
197. See, e.g., Gary L. Pleger, SEC Interpretative Letter, supra note 194; Castagan Busi-

ness Brokerage, Inc., SEC Interpretative Letter, supra note 194; Garrett/Kushell/Associates,
SEC Interpretative Letter, supra note 194.
198. Victoria Bancroft, SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2517 (July 9,
1987); International Business Exch. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act. LEXIS

3065 (Dec. 12, 1986).
199. International Business Exch. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 198.
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quirements. They also reveal some of the essential attributes of the definition of broker. These include negotiating the terms of securities transactions, giving advice on the value of securities, receiving compensation based
on the outcome of securities transactions, and providing assistance in financing securities transactions.
E. Matching Services
Increased interest in encouraging entrepreneurship and providing sources
of venture capital has given birth to a new type of finder, who refers investors to issuers through matching services. Potentially, these services are subject to the broker-dealer registration requirements if they facilitate financing
of entrepreneurs by investors through the issuance or transfer of securities.
The staff has not required registration of these matching services, however,
to the extent that they serve merely as clearinghouses for information. 200
The first staff no-action letter released in this area has served as the model
for the many that have followed.2 ° '
In Venture CapitalNetwork, Inc., a company proposed to operate a computer matching service to link investors with entrepreneurs seeking financing. 22002 The entrepreneurs and investors would deal directly with each other
after review by the investors of the entrepreneurs' business plans.2 "3 The
200. See infra notes 201-09.
201. Venture Capital Network, Inc. (VCN), SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 8, 1984). VCN
also received a no-action position on investment adviser registration. Venture Capital Network, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,660,
at 78,987 (Apr. 5, 1984). The staff of the Division of Investment Management stated that
VCN would be providing "analyses or reports concerning securities" within the meaning of
"investment adviser" under section 202(a)(1 1) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l 1) (1988), but not "as part of a regular business" within the
meaning of that section. Id. at 78,991-92. VCN was a nonprofit organization, and no compensation would be paid to any director, officer, employee, or other person for providing reports
concerning securities. Id. at 78,992. Moreover, the small business development program
within the state university system, which would process, for a fee, information from questionnaires submitted by users of the service, was deemed to be a state instrumentality itself, exempt
from registration as an investment adviser under section 202(b) of the Advisers Act. Id. Subsequent requests resulted in no-action positions on investment adviser registration. See, e.g.,
University of Ark., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 3061 (Oct. 6, 1986);
Investment Contact Network, SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 3066 (Sept.
8, 1986); Venture Capital Exch., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,310, at 76,937 (Mar. 24, 1986); Indiana Inst. for New Business
Ventures, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
78,189, at 76,768 (Dec. 11, 1985). The more recent requests have not addressed this issue,
perhaps because the Division of Investment Management no longer regards the question as an
open one.
202. Venture Capital Network, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 8, 1984).
203. Id.
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staff's no-action position was based on the premise that the matching system's operator would avoid certain activities, including:
(i) advising entrepreneurs or investors on the merits of particular
opportunities;
(ii) receiving fees from users of the matching service, other than
one-time, nominal application fees to cover administrative
costs;

(iii) participating in the negotiation of the terms of the investors'
investments in the entrepreneurs' businesses;
(iv) holding itself out as providing anything more than an intro-

ductory computer match;
(v) providing information concerning how an investor and an en-

trepreneur could complete a transaction after the introductory
match; and

(vi) handling funds or securities involved in completing a
transaction. °
The staff has approved similar matching services sponsored by state instrumentalities,205 private, nonprofit corporations, 20 6 and quasi-governmental
organizations.20 7 The latter class of sponsors has posed problems for the
staff, perhaps because the staff believes that conflicts of interest could arise if
the owners were also users of such systems. As a result, the staff has required representations that such systems would be run solely on a cost recovery basis, and not for the profit of their owners.2 °8 In addition, the staff
has required that the founders, incorporators, directors, officers, and employees of the quasi-governmental organization and the corporations over
204. Id
205. See, e.g., Kansas Venture Capital Network, SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 SEC NoAct. LEXIS 1061 (Aug. 8, 1988); Private Investor Network, SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 52 (Oct. 2, 1987); Mississippi Research & Dev. Ctr. & Miss. Venture Capital
Clearing House, SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2510 (June 18, 1987);
Venture Capital Network of N.Y., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
3062 (Oct. 15, 1986); University of Ark., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 201; Investment
Contact Network, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 201; Indiana Inst. for New Business
Ventures, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 201.
206. See, e.g., Heartland Venture Capital Network, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 2213 (May 7, 1987); Wyoming Small Business Dev. Ctr., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1987 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2319 (Apr. 13, 1987); Venture Capital Exch., Inc., SEC NoAction Letter, supra note 201.
207. See, e.g., Venture Match of N.J., SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
2225 (May 11, 1988); Venture Capital Network of N.Y., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1988
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 388 (Jan. 13, 1988); VCN of Tex., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 SEC NoAct. LEXIS 2225 (May 18, 1987); Venture Capital Network of N.Y., Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1987 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2077 (Mar. 6, 1987); Atlanta Economic Dev. Corp., SEC
No-Action Letter, 1987 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1846 (Feb. 17, 1987).
208. See, e.g., Atlanta Economic Dev. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 207.
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which these persons exercise control would not participate in the matching
service as entrepreneurs or investors.2 "9
The staff's positions in this area are appropriate. Any benefits to be
gained by requiring these matching services to register as broker-dealers are
outweighed by the increasing role that the services play in generating investment capital for small businesses. The services are providing information
and not acting as an instrumentality through which securities are purchased
or sold. The financial responsibility concerns militating in favor of brokerdealer registration are not present, because these services are not holding the
funds or securities of their users. Finally, the conflict-of-interest condition
seems appropriate if the owners or affiliates of matching services are able to
use the services. This condition does not apply if the services are owned by
state instrumentalities or private, nonprofit corporations not investing or engaging in entrepreneurial activity.
V.

REFERRING INVESTORS TO OTHER INVESTORS

The final class of finders that this article will discuss is composed of persons who attempt to arrange trades between buyers and sellers of securities.
Because this intermediary function is perhaps at the core of broker-dealer
activity, the staff may have been unwilling to take no-action positions in this
area, as it has in some of the other areas discussed above. For example, a
person who inquired whether he could charge a pre-arranged fee for arranging securities transactions between private investors was denied a definitive
response. 210 Another person stated that he wished to arrange for individuals
to exchange tax-exempt bonds by placing advertisements in newspapers
describing the bonds in detail. 21 ' He would then put the owners in touch
with each other and receive a fee based on the value of the bonds exchanged.
The staff stated that, under such circumstances, broker-dealer registration
would be required.21 2 Other persons who proposed to prepare and distribute
209. Id.
210. Joseph McGulley, SEC Interpretative Letter (Feb. 18, 1975).
211. A.E. Grudin, SEC Interpretative Letter, 1981 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 4341 (Nov. 30,
1981).
212. Id. Counsel asked the staff to reconsider, arguing that, beyond introducing the parties

to each other, his client did not negotiate or take an active role in completing these transactions. Counsel also argued that his client was merely supplying names of interested persons to
others. The staff remained adamant, however, stressing that counsel's client was engaged in

continuous, public solicitation of investors to facilitate trades or swaps, matching securities to
determine the comparability of various issues, and receiving compensation for completed

transactions. The staff added that it could not assure counsel that no enforcement action
would be recommended if the client proceeded as described. A.E. Grudin, SEC No-Action
Letter (Dec. 23, 1981).

1991]

The "Finder's"Exception

lists of their securities holdings were informed that this activity could constitute both a regular business, within the definition of dealer in section
3(a)(5),2 13 and an attempt to induce securities transactions, within the meaning of section 15(a)(1).214 In addition, an employee of a government securities broker, who proposed to engage in transactions in corporate bonds by
inviting sellers of those bonds to make offers at prices that would include a
commission payable upon finding buyers and executing the sales, was told
flatly that broker-dealer registration was required and received a registration
application by return mail.2 15
A.

Listing Services

The staff has been more lenient if persons seeking to match investors with
each other are willing to limit their activities to providing information only,
by essentially serving as a bulletin board. These individuals are also willing
to eschew receipt of any compensation based on the occurrence or value of
resulting securities transactions. This type of listing service sponsored by
third parties2 16 or by issuers themselves 217 has received no-action treatment
from the staff regarding broker-dealer registration. 2 18 Generally, listing
services provide only information about securities available for purchase or
213. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (1988).
214. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (1988); see Robert C. DeFazio, SEC Interpretative Letter, 1981
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 4408 (Dec. 17, 1981).
215. Ethan M. Heisler, SEC Interpretative Letter, 1983 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2887 (Sept.
25, 1983).
216. See, e.g., Investex Inv. Exch., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
609 (Apr. 9, 1990); Petroleum Info. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
1236 (Nov. 28, 1989) (taking no position on the application of proposed Rule 15c2-10, which
would provide for the Commission's review of proprietary trading systems not operated as
facilities of national securities exchanges); see also Proprietary Trading Sys., Exchange Act
Release No. 26,708 (Apr. 11, 1989), 54 Fed. Reg. 15429 (Apr. 18, 1989); Troy Capital Servs.,
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,975, at
78,903 (Apr. 28, 1989); Real Estate Fin. Partnership, SEC No-Action Letter, (1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,994, at 78,903 (Apr. 4, 1989).
217. Farmland Indus., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1187 (Aug.
26, 1991); Tri-State Livestock Credit Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
1058 (Oct. 18, 1989); CNB Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 SEC No-Act LEXIS 758 (June
9, 1989). In response to a earlier request concerning the necessity of broker-dealer registration
in connection with one of these arrangements, the Division of Market Regulation asked for,
but did not receive, further information and legal analysis. Maryland Old Line Corp., SEC
No-Action Letter, 1976 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 79 (Dec. 13, 1976).
218. Other issues outside the scope of this paper also are raised by these listing services,
including whether a listing service should be deemed an investment adviser, see Advisers Act
§ 202, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(ll) (1988), an exchange, see Exchange Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f
(1988), or a securities information processor, see Exchange Act § 3(a)(22), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(22) (1988), and therefore subject to other registration requirements. See Advisers Act
§ 203, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (1988); Exchange Act §§ 5, 1IA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78e, 78k-1 (1988).
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sale. All negotiations, purchases, and sales occur outside the service. There
may be one-time access fees or flat periodic subscription fees.2 19
The services may provide buyers and sellers with historical trade data;
however, they may not set the purchase price for securities, match or participate in negotiations between buyers and sellers, or handle their funds or securities. 22' The staff may view these no-action positions as accommodations
to the expressed needs of holders of the securities of certain types of issuers.
These issuers include limited partnerships, which do not have active secondary trading in their securities and therefore cannot interest a broker-dealer
in making a market in the securities. 2 2' Some of the letters expressly state
that the listing services will not be publicized 22 2 or that persons will not be
223
solicited to include their names on the list.
B

Trading Systems

A privately-operated trading system is yet another type of service bringing
together buyers and sellers of securities. These systems go beyond merely
providing information about indications of interest in buying or selling securities. Rather, they offer their users the capability of completing securities
transactions through the systems. The systems thus mimic traditional broker-dealer activity so closely that the staff has been unable to give assurances
that it would refrain from recommending enforcement action if the systems
did not register as broker-dealers with the Commission.224
For example, the staff was unable to concur with counsel's opinion that a
proposed automated trading information system intended to facilitate secon219. See, e.g., Investex Inv. Exch., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 216; Real Estate
Fin. Partnership, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 216. In at least one case, information was
provided free of charge. See, e.g., Farmland Indus., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 217.
220. See, e.g., Troy Capital Servs., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 216; Tri-State Livestock Credit Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 217.
221. See, e.g., Troy Capital Servs., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 216.
222. See, e.g., id.; CNB Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 217.
223. Farmland Indus., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 217; Tri-State Livestock
Credit Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 217.
224. These systems may raise the same ancillary issues as those raised by listing services.
See supra note 217; see also Wunsch Auction Sys. Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1990-1991
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
78,662, at 78,031 (Feb. 28, 1991) (concerning
single-price auction system for secondary trading of specified equity and fixed-income securi-

ties, utilizing registered broker-dealer); RMJ Sec., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 21 (Jan. 12, 1989) (concerning trading system for over-the-counter options on U.S.
Treasury securities utilizing registered government securities broker). The Commission
granted the Wunsch single-price auction trading system an exemption from exchange registration on the basis of low volume. Order Granting Limited Volume Exemption from Registration as an Exchange Under Section 5 of the Securities Exchange Act, Exchange Act Release
No. 28,899 (Feb. 20, 1991), 56 Fed. Reg. 8377 (Feb. 28, 1991).
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dary trading in mortgages among institutions would not be a broker, even
though no transaction-based compensation would be paid.2 25 Users would
enter into the system complete and detailed offers to sell securities, and if a
buyer indicated acceptance of the offer, the system would display the trans-

action as closed. 226 A system to provide a market place for trading oil and
gas royalties was also denied a no-action position.2 27 The system would effect transactions by matching buyers and sellers, and it would have the discretion to charge a commission.2 28
The staff did take a no-action position, however, regarding an electronic

information system that would enable its subscribers, which were limited to
broker-dealers or their registered representatives, to trade units of registered
limited partnerships.2 29 After offers to buy and sell a unit had been entered
into the system, it would contact the subscriber representing the person with
the highest offer and the subscriber representing the seller, and it would act

as intermediary between the two parties to close the transaction. The system
would clear and settle the transaction and receive a commission from both
subscribers. The staff stated that, while the system's proposed activities
could require it to register with the Commission as a broker-dealer and in
other capacities, requiring registration "could impede the development of
innovative systems for trading and settling [trades in] limited partnership
interests.., where careful protections are included to ensure the integrity of
contacts occur through a
customer funds and securities, and all customer
' 230
personnel.
its
or
broker-dealer
registered
225. Schwartz, Kobb, Scheimert, Hammerman & Johnson, SEC No-Action Letter, [1979
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) 82,037, at 83,665 (Feb. 15, 1979).
226. Id.
227. National Royalty Exch., SEC No-Action Letter, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 78,933, at 78,646 (Dec. 21, 1988).
228. Id.
229. National Partnership Exch., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1985-1986 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 78,161, at 76,700 (Aug. 2, 1985).
230. Id. The system agreed: (i) to provide quarterly reports to the Commission on its operations; (ii) to give the staff prior written notice of any proposed material changes in its operations; (iii) to submit voluntarily to examination by the Commission; (iv) to maintain a separate
bank account for customers' funds, which would be used only to settle customers' transactions;
and (v) to obtain a fidelity bond insuring the system against theft by employees of customers'
securities or funds. One year later, the system decided to conduct its operations through a
registered broker-dealer that it had formed, and the staff modified its no-action position accordingly. National Partnership Exch., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 Sec No-Act. LEXIS
260 (July 18, 1986).
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CONCLUSION

This paper has examined the purposes and scope of the federal brokerdealer registration requirements as manifested in their application to finders.
These finders include persons who refer investors to broker-dealers, to issuers, and to other investors. The application of these requirements to finders
ultimately depends on what activities the finders conduct and how they are
compensated. Finders who avoid conducting sales efforts, making recommendations about securities, participating in negotiations between buyers
and sellers of securities, holding investors' funds or securities, and receiving
compensation based, however indirectly, on the outcome of securities transactions resulting from the contact initiated by the finders, can avoid being
required by the staff of the Commission to register as broker-dealers.
The staff's flexibility regarding finders may be subject to valid criticism on
theoretical, legal grounds. The overriding purposes of the Exchange Actinvestor protection and the advancement of the public interest-would appear to support a broad reading of the definition of broker, so that persons
acting or holding themselves out as securities professionals may be regulated
accordingly. And the Commission itself, in a wide variety of contexts, has
read "effecting" transactions broadly. As discussed in this paper, the term
can signify much more in the broker-dealer registration context than merely
performing the physical acts of exchanging money and securities, so that
title to those securities passes from seller or issuer to buyer.
From a practical standpoint, however, elimination of the de facto finder's
exception from broker-dealer registration could result in an unwarranted,
and perhaps unwanted, expansion of the Commission's regulatory jurisdiction. 231 As long as there continues to be no evidence of demonstrated abuses
231. JAFFE, supra note 52, § 2.04 at 22. As Jaffe points out:
The careful delineation by the staff of the Commission and other regulatory bodies is
not, however, in practice strictly enforced. Most business arrangements involve some

transfers of corporate stock and it would be naive at best to assume that the typical
businessman acting as a finder simply introduces the parties and then immediately
leaves the room so as to be careful not to participate in the negotiations. A careful
application of the rules relating to finders would result in numerous enforcement
actions and the wholesale registration of businessmen who are unfamiliar with the
detailed regulations governing conduct in the brokerage business and who do not

engage in the business in any traditional sense. Whether or not there is any necessity
for this type of regulation, it is unlikely that the wholesale filings which would ensue
upon a strict enforcement of § 3(a)(4) could either be processed by or would be

looked upon with favor by the staff of the Commission.
Id.
Finders most assuredly wish to avoid complying with the many detailed statutory and regulatory requirements applicable to broker dealers. In the future, however, there is at least the
possibility of a reduced net capital requirement of $5,000 for registered brokers-dealers that
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resulting from the staff's flexible approach, increased regulation of most
finders would be neither necessary nor appropriate, despite the fact that they
may cross into the realm of broker-dealer activity. Allowing the staff to
interpret the broker-dealer registration requirements as they apply to finders
on a case-by-case basis is the best way to allow for distinguishing between
finders acting as broker-dealers and those not actively engaged in "effecting
transactions in securities."
Nevertheless, the activities forbidden to finders help elucidate what it
means to be engaged in the business of "effecting transactions in securities,"
as that phrase is used in the Exchange Act definitions of broker and dealer.
Conducting sales efforts, making recommendations about securities, participating in negotiations between buyers and sellers of securities, holding investors' funds or securities, and receiving transaction-based compensation are
hallmarks of the broker-dealer. Engaging in any one of these activities may
be sufficient to require registration if carried on with any degree of
regularity.
It is especially important, both to preserve the exception for legitimate
finders and to enforce the broker-dealer registration requirements, that receipt of any compensation based, even indirectly, on the outcome of a securities transaction be limited to regulated securities professionals. Transactionbased compensation is a powerful incentive for unscrupulous finders to effect
securities transactions. They may resort to methods of operation deemed by
Congress to pose such risks to the public interest and the protection of investors that our present extensive system of federal regulation is the only adequate prophylactic measure.

"do not take customer orders, hold customer funds or securities, or execute customer trades,"
but "register with the Commission because of the nature of their activities," such as "identify[ing] and locat[ing] potential merger and acquisition opportunities on behalf of a client, and
thereby earning a percentage fee." Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 27,249 (Sept.
15, 1989), 54 Fed. Reg. 40,395, 40,401 (Oct. 2, 1989).

